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Abstract
This study examines the influence of the social networks of the board of directors on the use 
of Balanced Scorecard (BSC) practices. Combining insights from research on social networks 
in management and literature on organizational innovativeness and accounting, our theoretical 
framework suggests that interlocking directorates influence the likelihood of BSC use. 
Modelling variation in the relationship between interlocking board members and making a 
distinction between different ways of BSC use, we measured the effects of the interlock ties 
of the executive and supervisory board members in a two-tier system on the use of the BSC as 
a strategic performance measurement tool in companies’ annual reports. Using data from 149 
companies listed on the Dutch stock exchange, our results suggest that director experience 
with BSC practices on other boards influences firm’s use of the BSC. Firms with board 
members who have experience with BSC practices in other firms they are associated with, 
have a higher probability to use this strategic performance measurement tool in their own firm 
too. Experience of the CEO is relevant for information disclosure about customers, while 
members of the supervisory board, especially the chairman, seem to promote additional 
information about internal business processes and learning and growth.
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1. Introduction
The Balanced Scorecard (BSC) is an important recent administrative innovation which is 
supposed to allow top managers to better measure and manage their companies’ key 
organizational processes resulting in an improved competitive market position and company 
performance (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1996, 2001, 2004). Empirical evidence suggests that 
this concept is widely used in large organizations in the United States and throughout Europe,
i.e. 20-30% of the larger firms investigated have adopted a BSC (Ittner, Larcker and Randall, 
2003; Speckbacher, Bischof and Pfeiffer, 2003). However, as is the case with other 
administrative innovations, the BSC lacks physical component and detailed implementation 
instructions. As a consequence, this strategic performance measurement system is open to 
multiple interpretations resulting in variation in the way this innovations is used in practice 
(Malmi, 2001; Speckbacher, Bischof and Pfeiffer, 2003; Chenhall, 2005). It also suggests that 
its implementation and use are complex, and the positive influence on organizational 
performance uncertain (Ittner, Larcker and Randall, 2003; Davis and Albright, 2004; Ittner, 
2008). To advance firm’s knowledge about the effectiveness of this innovation and its 
competitive advantages, firm’s top management decision makers may want to obtain 
additional information to decide whether to adopt and use the BSC. This information should 
help to reduce uncertainty and risks associated with their decisions to implement this 
innovation, and increase their understanding of how the tool might fit organization’s needs 
and opportunities effectively. However, relatively little is known about which sources of 
information influence a company’s decision to use this strategic performance measurement 
system.
This paper focuses on the influence of interlocking directorates on administrative 
innovativeness in general and on the BSC in particular. An interlocking directorate occurs 
when a person affiliated with one organization sits on the board of directors of another 
organization (Mizruchi, 1996). The social network literature emphasizes the role of board 
interlocks as a source of inter organizational information exchange about potential and 
effective innovative corporate practices (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). From an 
informational perspective, board interlocks are influential in corporate decision making and 
control relative to other sources of information because of the trustworthy, credible, and 
consequently persuasive nature of the information they convey (Useem, 1984; Haunschild, 
1993; Mizruchi, 1996; Davis, 1996; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997; Gulati and Westphal, 
1999; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Rogers, 2003; Borgatti and Foster, 2003). However, in 
accounting literature little attention has been paid to the influence of board interlock ties
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among organizations through key decision makers of one organization sitting in the boards of 
others on accounting innovativeness. It is not clear how a focal firm’s decisions are 
influenced by exposure of their key decision makers to experiences of other organization 
which made similar decisions.
In this paper we examine the influence of interlocking directorates on the use of the 
BSC as a strategic performance measurement tool in the companies’ annual reports. We 
investigate the role of the interlock ties of executive and supervisory board members in 
supporting use of the BSC, and how this role was affected by the positions of the members in 
the board. Directors often work for several firms, which allow them to bring experience from 
one firm to another. Exposure to the experiences of other firms may provide them with 
valuable information which they use in their own firm to influence organizational behaviour. 
The idea of the paper is to identify the cross-firm diffusion of BSC practices, using 
information of the interlocks of firms’ board of directors and their external auditors. We apply 
this approach to companies in a small region, i.e. Dutch firms, since relatively small 
communities are characterized by a high degree of interlocking relationships (Carroll and 
Fennema, 2002). We use data from 149 companies listed on the Dutch stock market to 
identify interlocking directorates and to assess use of the BSC as a strategic performance 
measurement tool in the companies’ annual reports. Our results suggest that experiences of 
board members with similar decisions in other companies affect firm’s use of the BSC. Firms 
with board members who have experience with this strategic performance measurement tool 
in other firms they are associated with, have a higher likelihood to use BSC practices in their 
own firm too. Experience of the CEO is relevant for information disclosure about customers, 
while members of the supervisory board, especially the chairman, seem to promote additional 
information about internal business processes and learning and growth. The external auditor’s 
experience matters for provision of information on financial aspects. These findings suggest 
that the social networks in which firms are embedded profoundly influence their conduct and 
use of particular organizational practices, stressing the importance to pay attention to the 
influence of intra organizational and interpersonal relations next to economic and 
organizational factors in driving organizational change.
This study is related to the literature in several ways. First, it is related to the 
accounting literature and the social network research on management. Despite the fact that 
management accounting research has investigated factors that affect accounting innovations 
like ABC (Shields, 1995) and TQM (Westphal, Gulati and Shortell, 1997), little research has 
been undertaken towards understanding the influence of social network ties of board members
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on their decisions to use such administrative innovations. Social network literature, on the 
other hand, emphasizes the role of social factors such as intra organizational and interpersonal 
relations rather than economic and organizational factors in facilitating the spread of 
innovations. From a network perspective board interlock ties to other firms are a form of 
social capital that provides access to information that flows through the network. Board 
interlocks have been found to influence many organizational practices, including governance 
practices (Davis, 1991), merger and acquisition (Haunschild, 1993), organizational structures 
(Palmer, Jennings and Zhou, 1993), and CEO compensation (Geletkanycz, Boyd and 
Finkelstein, 2001). This study contributes to both types of literature by examining whether 
and how board interlock ties facilitate administrative innovation diffusion, i.e. BSC usage.
Second, this study is related to the literature on interlocking directorates. Despite the 
general assumption in empirical interlock research that all ties affect outcomes uniformly, 
results show that some interlocks are more influential than others. Haunschild and Beckman 
(1998) made a distinction between interlock partners in similar and dissimilar industries to 
show that some interlocks are more influential than others. In this paper we specify and model 
variation in the positions of the interlocking board members in a two-tier system, i.e. 
executive and supervisory board members, to examine their differential influence on BSC 
usage.
Third and closely related to the previous issue, this study adds to the literature on 
administrative innovations (Rogers, 2003). In contrast to technical innovations that tend to be 
determined by their tangible design and content, administrative innovation’s intangibility has 
been found to lead to serious variation in its interpretation and use (e.g. Benders and Van 
Veen, 2001). This study takes into accountant that under the same label, the BSC can and will 
be used in different ways involving many different functional areas and strategic performance 
indicators (Malmi, 2001; Olson and Slater, 2002; Speckbacher, Bischof and Pfeiffer, 2003; 
Braam and Nijssen, 2004; Ax and Bj0rnenak, 2005). We examine the influence of 
heterogeneity among board interlocks on the use of the four measurement perspectives of the 
BSC described by Kaplan and Norton (1992).
Finally, in spite of the fact that the primary focus of interlock research is on the effects 
of direct network ties, empirical evidence suggests that indirect network ties -  or third-party 
ties -  can also influence company’s decisions to use various organizational practices (Gulati 
and Westphal, 1999). In this paper we study whether experiences of firm’s external auditor 
with BSC practices in related firms influence company’s use of this accounting-based strategy 
control tool. The auditor’s influence is indirect because the organizations’ top management
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decision makers receive the information about BSC use in related firms second-hand. On the 
other hand, the interlocks arguments should apply for the firm’s external auditor because the 
auditor is exposed to innovative organizational practices in other firms and the auditor can use 
this experience to influence company’s management and supervisory board on use of such 
corporate practices.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. First, we review related literature 
and develop hypotheses regarding the influence of interlocking directorates on firm’s use of 
BSC practices. Next the research method is described, and the results are presented and 
discussed. Finally, we draw conclusions, discuss limitations of our study, and point out 
directions for further research.
2. Literature review and development of hypotheses
The board of directors generally has a dominant position in shaping an organization’s strategy 
and management control systems (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). The BSC offers them a 
strategic management tool for describing and implementing corporate strategy using a 
comprehensive set of financial and non-financial strategic performance measures covering the 
measurement perspectives financial, customer, internal business, and learning and growth 
orientation (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1996, 2001, 2004; Drew and Kaye, 2007). However, 
like other administrative innovations, the BSC lacks detailed “product specifications”. As a 
consequence, the tool can be and is used in different ways, which make its implementation 
complex (Ahn, 2001; Malmi, 2001; Malina and Selto, 2001; Ax and Bj0rnerak, 2005). In 
addition, research shows that different ways of BSC use may have different effects on 
company performance, i.e. BSC use that complements corporate strategy positively influences 
company’s competitive position and company performance, while BSC use that is only 
loosely related to the strategy may decrease it (Ittner, Larcker and Randall, 2003; Davis and 
Albright, 2004; Braam and Nijssen, 2004; Chenhall, 2005; Ittner, 2008). As a result, firm’s 
top management decision makers may want to obtain additional information to decide 
whether and how to use this strategic performance measurement system. This information 
should help to reduce uncertainty and risks associated with their decisions to implement and 
use this innovation, and increase their understanding of how the tool might fit organization’s 
needs and opportunities effectively.
The social network literature emphasizes the role of board interlocks as an influential 
source of inter organizational information exchange about such potential effective innovative 
corporate practices (Useem, 1984; Mizruchi, 1996; Davis, 1996; Carpenter and Westphal,
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2001; Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Rogers, 2003). Exposed to the practices in other firms, 
interlock ties to other firms are potentially influential channels to convey trustworthy, credible 
and valuable information about other firms. They provide opportunities to share strategic 
information and learn about innovations that might fit unique organizational needs and 
opportunities (Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997; Haunschild and Beckman, 1998; Gulati and 
Westphal, 1999; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Borgatti and Foster, 2003). Interlocks enable 
board members to achieve a ‘business scan’ of latest business practices, observing innovative 
practices in other firms, and witness firsthand the consequences of those practices (Useem, 
1984). Moreover, direct contact with an innovator may help to clarify whether and how a 
specific innovation might fit unique organizational needs and opportunities, thus reducing 
uncertainty and risks associated with the innovation (Haunschild, 1993). For these reasons, 
network research in management suggests that inter organizational and interpersonal network 
ties are key antecedents to consider when explaining the spread of information about an 
innovation across organizations and their effects on the adoption and use of organizational 
innovations (Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Mizruchi, 1996; Rogers, 2003). Consequently, firms 
that are interlocked with current adopters will be more likely to adopt and use themselves 
(Rogers, 2003; Mizruchi, 1996). Related studies have used board interlocks to explain the 
adoption of organizational innovations, including governance practices (Davis, 1991), merger 
and acquisition (Haunschild, 1993), organizational structures (Palmer, Jennings and Zhou, 
1993), and CEO pay premiums (Geletkanycz, Boyd and Finkelstein, 2001). This evidence 
suggests that firms are more likely to make changes in their performance measurement 
practices if their key decision makers have ties to leaders of other firms engaging in similar 
innovative practices (Haunschild, 1993; Westphal and Zajac, 1997; Gulati and Westphal, 
1999). Hence,
H1: BSC use in a firm  is positively related to use o f BSC practices in other companies to 
which the firm  is related via their board interlocks.
In empirical research on board interlocks all interlock ties were generally treated as 
equal connections that facilitate the exchange of information between firms. However, the 
governance literature suggests that interlocks may not uniformly affect outcomes. 
Heterogeneity among board interlock members may affect the extent in which they convey 
information and how they influence decisions about adoption and use of various 
organizational practices (Haunschild and Beckman, 1998; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; 
Borgatti and Foster, 2003). In this paper we examine the influence of the interlocks of the
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executive and supervisory board members in a two-tier structure on specific ways of use of 
the BSC. In a two-tier structure the executive is responsible for the administration of the firm, 
while the supervisory board is charged with monitoring and controlling management’s 
decision making to protect shareholders’ interests. However, agency theory emphasizes that 
the supervisory board is less well informed than the management board because the former 
board wholly consists of outsiders. As a result, executive and supervisory board members, 
who may have different goals and objectives, may differently affect the way of use of the 
BSC as a strategic performance measurement system focusing on financial and non-financial 
strategic performance indicators in different perspectives to realize their goals and objectives 
(Drew and Kaye, 2007; Braam, Benders and Heusinkveld, 2007). Their exposures to the 
experiences with similar decisions in other companies via their interlock ties may confirm and 
enforce their decisions about how to use the BSC in a specific way. To uncover differential 
effects, we investigate the effects of the interlock ties of executive and supervisory board 
members on the use of the four measurement perspectives of the BSC described by Kaplan 
and Norton (1992), as well as the influence of the interlocks of the CEO, the CFO, other 
members of the executive board, the chairman of the supervisory board and the other 
members of the supervisory board on company’s use of these perspectives. Hence,
H2: Use o f  the specific measurement perspectives o f the BSC in a firm  is positively related 
to use o f these perspectives in other companies to which the firm  is related via their 
board interlocks.
H3: The positive correlation o f  the use o f the specific measurement perspectives o f  the 
BSC in a firm  with the use o f these perspectives in others firms to which there is a 
board interlock depends on the positions o f members in the board.
3. Research method
3.1 Data
The data used in this paper were collected using two databases: (1) data on general firm 
information and information about the interlock ties of executive and supervisory directors 
and auditors from Osiris; (2) data on financial and non-financial strategic performance 
indicators in companies’ annual reports from AnnualReports. These data were subsequently 
merged yielding a complete data set.
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We restricted our data to companies in a small region, i.e. Dutch companies since 
relatively small communities are characterized by a high degree of interlocking relationships 
(Mizruchi, 1996; Carroll and Fennema, 2002). The companies selected met the following 
criteria: they were publicly listed on the NYSE Euronext Amsterdam in 2004, had their 
headquarters in the Netherlands, and had a two-tier structure. Our sample comprises 149 
Dutch companies.
For a comprehensive measurement system to be a BSC, it should contain financial and 
non-financial strategic performance measures that cover the original four measurement 
perspectives described by Kaplan and Norton (1992) (Malmi, 2001; Speckbacher, Bischof 
and Pfeiffer, 2003). To assess a company’s use of the BSC as strategic performance 
measurement system, we used publicly available data from annual reports. An important 
advantage of these data is that we can assess the variety of ways how the firms selected 
effectively use a comprehensive set of financial and non-financial strategic performance 
measures. Measuring actual use of the BSC is important since the assessment of its formal use 
may result in biased results (Ittner, Larcker and Randall, 2003). Companies that formally say 
to have adopted such a tool may not effectively use it but may have adopted the tool for other 
reasons like legitimacy (Westphal, Gulati and Shortell, 1997). In addition, firms that actually 
use the BSC may not explicitly mention that they use this strategic performance measurement 
system or use other names for similar practices (Chenhall, 2005).
3.2 Measurement of variables
3.2.1 Dependent variables
BSC usage as strategic performance measurement system was measured using a 68-item scale 
adapted from Hoque and James (2000), Maltz, Shenhar and Reilly (2003), and Chenhall 
(2005). The instrument comprised financial and non-financial strategic performance measures 
covering the four scorecard perspectives described by Kaplan and Norton (1992), i.e. 
financial, customer, internal business, and learning and growth orientation, using respectively 
20, 17, 12 and 19 strategic performance indicators with dichotomous scales (‘yes’ or ‘no’). 
Appendix A presents a full overview of the items used classified per perspective. Two 
independent raters assessed the scores on these performance indictors using content analysis. 
An indictor receives a score of ‘ 1 ’if the annual report provides relevant information about this 
measure, otherwise ‘0’. To compute a standardized outcome for each of the four measurement 
perspectives, the scores of each individual question referring to this information category 
were added and divided by the number of questions. This results in a score between 0-1; 0
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indicating a poor score on a BSC perspective, while an outcome of 1 implies excellence. For 
each annual report assessed, the standardized outcomes for the perspectives were added and 
divided by four to construct a measure for overall BSC usage. Figures 1-5 show the 
distributions of the total BSC scores and the sub scores on the four BSC perspectives.
[Insert Figures 1-5]
3.2.2 Independent variables
The main independent variables of interest are the average and maximum total BSC scores 
and the sub scores on the four BSC perspectives of the companies to which the firm is related 
via the interlocks of the board of directors and its external auditor.
To identify the interlocking directorates we used the Osires data base which provides the 
names of all board members in the firm in our sample, with their function within the firm. 
After correcting differences in spelling of the name of the same person, we matched for each 
board member within a firm, all the other firms in which this person was also a board 
member. Based on these relationships, we calculated the average and maximum scores on the 
four perspectives for a certain member in each of his/her related firms. These numbers thus 
indicate the average and most extensive use in the annual report of a certain facet of the BSC 
in any of the other firms of a board member.
To aggregate these outside experiences of all board members to figures on firm level, we 
clustered the functions of the board member into five categories:
1) CEO;
2) CFO;
3) Other member of the board;
4) Chairman of the supervisory board;
5) Other member of the supervisory board.
Per firm, first, we assessed the average and maximum BSC scores for all these categories. 
Second, we computed the average or the maximum scores for board members in the executive 
board (1, 2, or 3) versus members of the supervisory board (4, 5). Third, we assessed the 
average and maximum BSC experiences for the board of directors as a whole. For measuring 
the interlock scores related to firm’s external auditor, we used a similar approach.
Finally, in our study measures are missing if firm’s board members or their auditor do 
not have interlocks. To eliminate potential biases caused by these missing variables we 
included dummy variables. These variables are equal to 1 if the board members and the 
auditor of the focal firm do not have interlocks, otherwise 0. The dummy coefficients can be
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interpreted as the effects of not having experience with the BSC in related firms on firm’s use 
of the BSC. The average and maximum (sub) scores for BSC experiences in other firms can 
be regarded as an estimate of the influence of interlocks among the firms that have interlock 
ties (Allison, 2001: 13-14).
3.2.3 Control variables
We included the natural logarithm of total employees or total assets, and industry dummies as 
control variables. The natural logarithm of total employees and/or total assets was included to 
proxy for the size of the company. Contingency theory suggests that larger companies have to 
provide more financial and non-financial information to meet the requirements and 
expectations of their interested parties than their smaller counterparts. Consistently, empirical 
evidences suggest that larger firms are more likely to use BSC practices than smaller firms 
(Hoque and James, 2000; Speckbacher, Bischof and Pfeiffer, 2003). The industry dummies 
were included to control for industry effects on BSC use.
3.3 Analysis
To asses the effects of interfirm network ties on the use of BSC practices, we used linear 
regression analysis and the dummy variable adjustment method (Allison, 2001). The dummy 
variable adjustment method produces optimal estimates for missing predictors in a regression 
analysis in situations in which data about a variable are missing because the unobserved 
values simply do not exist, i.e. the firm does not have board or auditor interlock ties (Allison, 
2001: 125).
To check the robustness of our results, we performed similar regression analyses with 
different measures of BSC use, i.e. average and maximum total BSC scores and the sub scores 
in the four perspectives, and different control variables.
4. Results
Table 1 presents the distribution of the sample firms across industry -  using the 2-digit SIC 
codes -  and size, and shows the number of positions of the executive and supervisory board 
members in their own company and in other firms they are associated with.
[Insert Table 1]
Table 2 presents the correlation between total BSC score and the sub scores on the 
four perspectives with and without correction for size effects. Tables 2 shows that the 
correlations between the total BSC score and the sub scores with and without correction for
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size effects ranged from respectively 0.512 and 0.439 for the financial perspective to 0.846 
and 0.830 for the learning and growth perspective, indicating acceptable internal levels of 
consistency.
[Insert Table 2]
The results in Table 3 panel A and B provide support for hypothesis H1, which 
predicts that BSC use in a firm is positively related to use of BSC practices in other 
companies to which the firm is related via their board interlocks. Using both the average and 
maximum total BSC scores of the interlocking firms as measures of the experience of the 
board of directors with BSC practices in the related firms, the results are consistently positive 
and significant. These findings suggest that interfirm network ties of board members 
positively affect company’s use of the BSC. However, no significant influence was found of 
the experiences of the external auditor with use of the BSC in related firms on firm’s use of 
this strategic measurement tool.
In addition, the analyses in the panels A and B also show that the results are robust. 
The relationships between a firm’s use of the BSC and the average and maximum experiences 
of the board of directors with BSC practices in related firms are consistently positive and 
significant when using different control variables. In the remainder of this study we use the 
average BSC (sub) scores as the measure of the influence of interfirm network ties.
[Insert Table 3]
The results in Table 4 show support for hypothesis H2, which predicts a positive 
relationships between use of the four specific measurement perspectives of the BSC in a firm 
and use of these perspectives in firms to which the firm is related via its board interlocks. The 
results show that the experiences of board members with use of the perspectives customer and 
learning and growth in related firms is relevant for firm’s information disclosure in these 
perspectives. In addition, the results show a significant influence of the experiences of the 
external auditor with use of the financial perspective in related firms on firm’s information 
disclosure in the financial perspective. These findings suggest that use of the perspectives 
customer and learning and growth is directly related to experiences of board members with 
use of these perspectives in related firms, while use of the financial perspective is indirectly 
related through the interlock ties of the firm’s external auditor.
[Insert Table 4]
Table 5 presents the results regarding the relationship between firm’s use of specific 
measurement perspectives of the BSC and the experiences of firm’s executive and 
supervisory board members and its external auditor with use of these perspectives in other
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firms they are associated with via their interlocks. These results show that experience of the 
CEO is relevant for information disclosure about customers, whereas the chairman of the 
supervisory board seems to promote additional information about internal business processes 
and learning and growth. Experience of the other members of the supervisory board is also 
relevant for information disclosure in the learning and growth perspective. The external 
auditor’s experience matters for provision of information on financial aspects, while the 
interlock ties of the other members of the supervisory board negatively moderate this effect. 
No significant influence was found of the board interlock ties of the CFO and other members 
of the executive board on specific BSC use. Consequently, these findings provide partial 
support for H3, which predicts that the positive correlations of the use of specific 
measurement perspectives of the BSC in a firm with the use of these perspectives in others 
firms to which there is a board interlock depend on the positions of members in the board. 
The findings suggest that the interlock ties of the CEO, the chairman of the supervisory board 
and the other members of the supervisory board influence strategic performance measurement 
in the customer perspective and information disclosure about internal business processes and 
innovation. Disclosure of information in the financial perspective is positively related to use 
of this perspective in other companies to which the firm is indirectly related through 
interlocks ties of its external auditor, while experiences of the other members of the 
supervisory board negatively affect this relationship.
[Insert Table 5]
5. Conclusion and Discussion
This paper has investigated the role of the social networks of the board of directors in 
supporting BSC use, and how this role was affected by the positions of the members in the 
board. Consistent with our general expectations, our findings show that director experience on 
other boards does affect decision making about strategic performance measurement. Firms 
with board members who have experience with BSC practices in other firms they are 
associated with, have a higher probability to use the BSC in their own firm too. Members of 
the supervisory board, especially the chairman, seem to promote additional information about 
internal business processes and innovation. Experience of the CEO is relevant for information 
disclosure about customers, while the external auditor’s experience matters for provision of 
information on financial aspects. These findings suggest that the social networks provide 
access to intra organizational information that is important in driving organizational change.
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The networks of relationships in which firms are embedded profoundly influence their 
conduct and use of particular organizational practices. In addition, the results stress the 
importance to pay attention to the influence of intra organizational and interpersonal relations 
next to economic and organizational factors in explaining the diffusion of administrative 
innovations like the BSC.
This study has several limitations. Two of these limitations are the use of cross 
sectional data of a small community which limit the generalizability of our findings, and the 
assumption made in the empirical part of paper that the members of the board of directors 
uniformly affect the decisions to use the BSC. Regarding the latter, powerful actors in the 
board may form dominant coalitions to control the decision making processes (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984; Zajac and Westphal, 1996; Golden and Zajac, 2001). Consequently, the 
influence of social networks of some members of the board could be more influential than the 
information from other interlock partners (Finkelstein, 1992). Another limitation of this paper 
is its focus on the inter organizational social networks of the board of directors, ignoring the 
contributions of other actors via intra organizational ties on the diffusion of BSC practices 
(Mizruchi, 1996). Organizational actors like the managers at business and departmental levels 
may influence BSC use as strategic performance measurement tool as well.
This study, which is exploratory in nature, leaves ample room for further research. 
First, future research could test and expand the research model using larger national and 
international samples to provide further insight into the external validity of the findings. 
Second, further studies may look at the extent to which dominant coalitions within the board 
of directors use their power and authority to influence the diffusion of organizational 
innovations in general and accounting innovations in particular. Finally, the analysis 
performed in this study could be complemented with the effects of indirect networks ties of 
other groups of actors which potentially can influence the diffusion of particular 
organizational practices. Increased understanding of the direct and indirect role of both inter 
organizational and intra organizational social networks of the firm’s key decision makers on 
the diffusion of innovative organizational practices may help to reap the benefits that Kaplan 
and Norton promised in their writings.
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Figure 1
Distribution of the total BSC scores
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Distribution of BSC scores on the customer perspective
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Figure 3
Distribution of the BSC scores on the internal business perspective
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Distribution of the BSC scores on the learning and growth perspective
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Distribution of the BSC scores on the financial perspective
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Table 1 Sample characteristics
Panel A: Firm characteristics
Industry Number Company size
of firms No of employees Assets per employee 
mean sd mean sd
Mining and construction 8 24875 37994 274 403
Manufacturing 68 13284 38112 220 221
Transportation and communication 16 15464 37940 4551 10790
Wholesale trade 15 10661 13941 185 220
Retail trade 11 25540 45147 3648 3142
Finance and Insurance 31 11501 39340 260 734
Total 149 14410 36724 946 3871
Panel B: Number of positions of the executive and supervisory board members in own and
other firms they are associated with
Board positions Total No positions in Number of board positions in
other firms in related firms
data set 1 2 3 >4
CEO 156 135 13 4 2 2
CFO 145 143 2 0 0 0
Other members of 430 407 19 4 0 0
the board of
directors
Chairman of the 150 104 19 16 11 0
supervisory board
Other members of 450 315 72 38 22 3
the supervisory
board
Total 1331 1104 125 62 35 5
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Table 2
Correlation between the total BSC Score and the sub scores on the four perspectives, with and without correction for size effects
Panel A: Pearson correlation coefficients without correction for size effects
Total Customer
Total
Customer
Internal-processes
Learning and growth
Financial
1.000 
731* ** 
722* * *
.846***
512***
1.000
374***
449***
.201**
Internal-processes Learning 
growth
1.000
.636***
.035
1.000
.266***
and
Panel B: Pearson correlation coefficients with correction for size effects
Total
Customer
Internal-processes
Learning and growth
Financial
Total
1.000
.688***
710***
.830***
.439***
Customer
1.000
.323***
382***
.101
Internal-processes
1.000
.610***
-.041
Learning
growth
and
1.000
.185**
= p < 0.01 (2-tailed); **= p<0.05 (2-tailed); *= p<0.10 (2-tailed)
Financial
1.000
Financial
1.000
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Relationship between the total BSC score and the average and maximum experience of board members and auditors with the BSC in other firms they are associated with 
Panel A: Relationships based on average experience
1 2 3
.795 .095 0.855 .127 1.070
2.631** .345 2.642*** .336 2.633***
Table 3
.083
.339
Constant
Average experience of board 
members with the BSC in related 
firms
No board member in other firms .149 
Average experience of auditor .189 
with the BSC in related firms 
No auditor in other firms .049
Ln(employees) .019
Ln(Assets)
Sector dummies No
2.173**
0.972
.493
3.909***
.152
.189
.051
.021
-.002
No
2.190**
0.972
0.508
2.724**
-0.323
.150
.219
.073
.020
Yes
2.190**
1.126
.723
4178***
F-statistic 
Adj. R2
9.053***
.214
7.515***
.209
4 895*** 
.240
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Table 3 (Continued)
Panel B: Relationships based on maximum experience
1 2
Constant .128 1.351 .142 1.389 .162
Maximum experience of board .264 2 .521** .271 2 .540** .279
members with the BSC in related
firms
No board member in other firms .122 1.993** .125 2 .018** .129
Maximum experience of auditor .162 .854 .164 .857 .203
with the BSC in related firms
No auditor in other firms .038 .387 .040 .408 .065
Ln(employees) .018 3 .650*** .020 2 .638*** .019
Ln( Assets) -.003 -.373
Sector dummies No No Yes
F-statistic 8.935 *** 7 424*** 4 .939:
Adj. R2 .211 .207 .242
*** = p < 0.01 (2-tailed); **= p<0.05 (2-tailed); *= p<0.10 (2-tailed)
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1.465
2 .681***
2 .147**
1.070
.660
3.873***
3
Relationship between the scores on the specific measurement perspectives of the BSC and the average experience of the board members and the external auditor with these 
perspectives in other firms they are associated with
Table 4
Customer
Constant .096 .918
Average experience of board members with .271 1.947*
specific BSC perspective
No board member in other firms .097 1.532
Average experience of the auditor with -.208 -.931
specific BSC perspective
No auditor in other firms -.035 -.380
Ln(employees) .030 4 .159***
F-statistic 5.237***
Adj. R2 .125
Internal Business Learning and Growth
.203
.070
.016
.206
.007
.014
2.509**
.049
1.703*
.557
.248
.865
.062
2.142**
.065
.379
.202
.206
-.016
.021
6.611***
.159
.478
2.862***
2.383**
.945
-.119
2.763***
Financial
.211
.003
-.024
.023
.284
.013
5.376***
.129
= p < 0.01 (2-tailed); **= p<0.05 (2-tailed); *= p<0.10 (2-tailed)
1.754*
.363
-.261
2.491**
2.365**
1.990**
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Relationship between the total BSC score and the scores on the specific measurement perspectives of the BSC and the average experience of the executive and supervisory 
board members and the external auditor with the BSC and its specific perspectives in other firms they are associated with
Total BSC score ____________________ Scores on the specific measurement perspectives of the BSC____________________
Table 5
Customer Internal Business Learning and growth Financial
Constant -.414 -1.345 -.250 -.808 .051 .109 -.457 -.813 .118 .297
Average experience of the CEO with 
specific BSC perspective
.293 1.245 .416 1.868* .210 .904 .093 .418 .000 .007
Average experience of the CFO with 
specific BSC perspective
.643 .880 .135 .079 .544 .353 .391 .352 .027 .876
Average experience of the other 
executive board members with 
specific BSC perspective
-.111 -.421 .009 .030 -.245 -.799 .283 1.146 .006 .446
Average experience of the chairman of 
supervisory board with specific BSC 
perspective
.360 2.391** .072 .383 .306 1.912* .469 2.955*** .003 .441
Average experience of the other 
supervisory board members with 
specific BSC perspective
.196 1.359 .210 1.392 -.214 -1.554 .272 1.789* -.020 -1.233**
No CEO in other firms .139 1.112 .182 1.469* -.031 -.293 .063 .443 .014 .062
No CFO in other firms .324 1.151 .164 .623 .342 .765 .110 .194 .245 .714
No other executive board member in 
other firms
-.025 -.188 .044 .374 -.108 -.0799 .223 1.430 .106 .650
No chairman of supervisory board in 
other firms
.170 2.131** .026 .324 .138 1.821* .244 2.398** .010 .095
No other supervisory board member in 
other firms
.060 .778 .017 .250 -.115 -1.633 .127 1.337 -.303 -1.605**
Average experience of auditor with 
specific BSC perspective
.144 .743 -.218 -.955 .188 .773 .111 .458 .264 2.249**
No auditor in other firms .029 .287 -.024 -.250 .002 .017 -.081 -.552 . 021 2.031**
Ln(employees)
F-statistic
Adj. R2
.018
4.375***
.229
3.439*** .029
2 .668***
3.658*** .006
2 443*** 
.112
.830 .021
3.190***
.161
2.595** .017
2.950***
.146
2.372**
*** = p < 0.01 (2-tailed); **= p<0.05 (2-tailed); *= p<0.10 (2-tailed)
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Appendix A
Strategic performance measures
Financial perspective
1 Sales growth
2 Net income
3 Extra ordinary results
4 Return on total assets
5 Cash flows from operations
6 Current ratio
7 Liquidity ratio
8 Solvency ratio
9 Gearing
10 Dividend distribution
11 Stock exchange rate
12 Price earnings ratio
13 Earnings per share
14 Fluctuation o f the shares
15 Turnover rate of capital invested
16 Return on capital employed
17 Average remuneration
18 Average cost of employee
19 Profit per employee
20 Tax growth or decline
Customer perspective
1 M arket share
2 Customer satisfaction
3 M arketing activities
4 Num ber o f customer complaints
5 On-time delivery
6 Percent shipment returned due to poor quality
7 W arranty repair cost
8 Customer response time
9 Cycle time from order to delivery
10 After-sales services and support
11 Customization o f products and services to customer needs
12 Sustainability o f client or customer relationships
13 New customers o f clients acquired
14 Num ber o f orders or contracts acquired
15 Turnover segmentation to market segments
16 M arket share growth related to sales growth
17 Sales growth related to marketing activities
Internal business perspective
1 M anufacturing lead-time
2 Order delivery time
3 Use of quality control systems (like TQM)
4 Dropout rates and waste
5 Staff competency requirements
6 Safety requirements
7 Capacity utilization
8 Labour efficiency variance
9 Material efficiency variance
10 Cost reduction o f operational processes
11 Efficiency o f logistics
12 Percentage defective products shipped
Learning and growth perspective
1 Introduction o f new products or services
2 Num ber o f new patents o f licenses
3 Time to market of new products
4 Influence o f changing market conditions
5 Influence o f changing technological conditions
6 Changes in product design
7 Investments in research and development
8 Speed development o f new products
9 Employee growth
10 Employee segmentation
11 Training programs
12 Hours o f employee (re)training
13 Employee satisfaction
14 Employee tenure
15 Employee remuneration policy
16 Sickness and absence policy
17 Qualified leadership
18 Knowledge sharing systems
19 Interactive control systems
1
